Syracuse University
Maxwell School of
Citizenship & Public Affairs
Maxwell X Lab

Performance Metrics for Incident Management: Final Report

Prepared for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)

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Prepared by

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Introduction and Statement of Task

The Department of Safety and Environmental Management is establishing a new incident management framework for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). Over the next year, the WMATA team aims to implement a clear and simple set of incident management procedures that will help ensure prompt service restoration, accountability to the public, and adherence to the rules and regulations in place. The team expects to finalize an incident management framework based on best practices, conduct a comprehensive training program with all relevant parties on the new procedures, and monitor performance metrics.

The Maxwell X Lab at Syracuse University has an agreement with WMATA to conduct background research on performance metrics for incident management in the academic literature, through case studies of other large metropolitan areas, and interviews with professionals in the transportation industry. The project took place in two phases:

- In the first phase of this project, the X Lab completed an academic literature review and created case studies describing different performance metrics in the public transportation agencies in New York, London, and Queensland.
- In the second phase of this project, the X Lab was tasked with gathering information about performance metrics that measure the quality of response to an incident. The research team completed extensive interviews with several military officers, the executive director of an airport in a medium-sized city, and the incident/emergency manager for a transportation department in a large-sized city.

Phase One

Objective

In the first phase of this project, the X Lab completed an academic literature review and created case studies describing different performance metrics in public transportation agencies. The case study locations and their respective transportation agencies include New York, London, and Queensland. We presented our findings and suggestions in a full-length report in June 2022. Below is a summary of that report's methods and major findings.

Methodology

For the first phase of this project, the X Lab gathered information from a review of the existing academic literature on incident management in public transportation systems and incident management performance metrics. The X Lab also conducted case studies on the incident management frameworks in three different cities and their respective transit agencies:

1. Metropolitan Transit Authority in New York City, NY
2. Transport for London in London, England,
3. Queensland Rail/Tran slink in Queensland Australia.

The main research questions guiding this phase were:

- How does the public transit agency define an incident?
- What performance metrics are used by the agency?
- How do public transportation agencies respond to their incident management metrics? Has it changed their incident management performance?

Much of the information to answer these questions came from the websites, public reports, and operating procedures of the transit agencies. In addition to the literature reviews, we also reached out to several individuals working at each of these public transportation agencies to ask about their incident management systems. We received an acknowledgement of the request for an interview response from at least one person from each organization. For two of the cases, we did not receive any future communications despite repeated attempts to reconnect. For the third case, our specific questions were not answered, but we were referred to public documents located on the web. Subsequent inquiries were not acknowledged.

Major Findings

How do public transit agencies define an incident?

There does not appear to be a universal definition of an incident in public transportation, but most authorities consider issues that affect the safety and security of passengers and public employees as

well as the expediency with which passengers reach their destination, an incident. In that respect, there is close agreement on the definition of an incident.

What performance metrics are used by the authority?

Examples from our case studies:

1. Metropolitan Transit Authority (New York City, New York, USA)
    - The number of major incidents (incidents that delay 50 or more trains) in the subway
    - Customer accident rate per million customers
    - The rate of injuries sustained on the job that results in loss of productive work time
    - The number of staff hours lost due to accidents per total staff hours
    - Percentage of trains reaching their destination on time
    - Average response time
    - Average resolution time

2. Transport for London (London, England)
    - Number of deaths and serious injuries on various modes of transportation
        - Number of bus occupant injuries due to collisions
        - Number of bus occupant injuries due to non-collision events, such as slipping
    - Number of bus collisions per year
    - Time lost by passengers due to any incident/service disruption of two minutes or more

3. Queensland, Australia
    - Number of incidents on the rail system related to:
        - Level crossing occurrences
        - Fatalities/hospitalizations
        - Major incidents (such as derailments and collisions)

While there is some variation in the wording and specifics from one agency to another, we determined that WMATA likely is already capturing all the relevant performance metrics for incident management.

How do public transportation agencies use performance metrics? How do they respond to them? Has it changed their incident management performance?

We found that transportation agencies use metrics in three general categories:

- Evaluating Performance: metrics are also used internally to evaluate performance over time. This evaluation shows organizations areas where they are improving performance, areas where they are remaining steady, and areas where performance is declining.

- Evaluating Internal System Changes: metrics can also be used to evaluate internal system changes and help organizations understand which programs/investments/etc. are making a positive difference and which are not.
- The Public: metrics are often used to provide information to the public to help them make better choices. Further, the transparency helps both the public and transit management hold relevant parties within these organizations accountable for incidents.

Examples from our case studies:

1. Metropolitan Transit Authority (New York City, New York, USA)
    - In 2017, former Governor Andrew Cuomo, declared a state of emergency for the MTA due to the high number of incidents involving the subway and bus systems. At the time, 65% of weekday trains reached their destinations on time, the lowest rate since a transit crisis in the 1970s. [1] In response, the MTA organized a $54 billion initiative to improve service, subway cars, buses, tracks and stations, and modernized signals. [2]

2. Transport for London (London, England)
    - In June of 2021, TfL saw a decline in the number of deaths and serious injuries across modes of transportation. This progress indicated that their strategic initiatives over the past year which included lowering speed limits, constructing safer intersections, and increasing the number of buses that follow the Bus Safety Standard, were generating progress.

3. Queensland, Australia
    - In 2016, the Queensland government initiated a review of bus driver safety due to the high number of incidents against bus drivers. The year prior, TMR-contracted bus operators reported 392 verbal and/or physical assaults. The government's review culminated in a five-point plan that addressed physical safety, best practices, education, high-risk areas, and policy. One major funding area of the plan was to install protective barriers for bus drivers and, by June of 2020, nearly 80% of all buses had the new barrier installed.

Additional Insights on Performance Metrics for Incident Management

- Performance metrics are often criticized because they do not tie causes to the metrics. [3] In the case studies we researched, there is no documentation that the transit group used an evaluation that would allow them to identify the source of the change, if one occurred. For instance, during the pandemic ridership seems to have changed dramatically. One cannot conclude with

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/nyregion/new-york-subway-system-failure-delays.html
[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-19/how-new-york-s-mta-is-riding-out-a-transit-crisis
[3] Heinrich, Carolyn. 2008. "Evidence-Based Policy and Performance Management: Challenges and Prospects in Two Parallel Movements." *American Review of Public Administration* 37(3): 255-77.

confidence that any change in performance was due to the incident management changes within the organization. The pandemic, changes in remote work, increases in fuel costs, as well as a host of other external factors could be the cause. For instance, in the case of the protective barriers in Queensland buses, two primary questions surface:

1. How much did the barriers actually reduce assaults? If there was a decline, is it possible that other changes created the improvement (at least partially)? For instance, was there a reduction in violence as ridership declined during the pandemic? Alternatively, perhaps as people returned to work, their stress levels eventually leveled off which reduced violence. Without a formal assessment, one can never be sure that the intervention created the change. In addition, a small pilot study with a robust evaluation would have allowed the Queensland agency to learn if they are efficacious before it placed these barriers in all buses.
2. Even if the barriers were effective, do they make sense from a cost-benefit perspective? Are there other options that could generate the same level of violence reduction at a lower cost? Was any cost-benefit analysis done on these doors? This question came up repeatedly in our analysis. New York City MTA tripled the number of Combined Action Teams (CATs) to respond to incidents on the subway. Details for their evaluation were not available, but this was part of a $836 million dollar investment in safety on the NYC subway. They report an improvement of 32 percent in response time and 39 percent in resolution time. Was this cost effective? Can they do the same (or even more) at a lower cost? We would encourage WMATA to consider a formal evaluation of their new incident management system and a cost benefit analyses where relevant.

- WMATA lists several targets for their performance metrics in their quarterly performance reports. For instance, the target crime rate in the first half of fiscal year 2022 was less than 8.0 crimes per million riders. WMATA reported 6.2 crimes per million riders - a rate they classified as a success. While there is a committee to determine these targets, the choice is crucial to both leadership and the public's assessment of performance. It is much easier to improve poor performance than high performance. Using a standard criterion, such as improving by 1 percent, may not be sustainable over a number of years. Also, at some point, the return on investment to improve in areas of success, likely do not provide as much benefit as investments in other areas of incident management.

- All the public transportation agencies track metrics at a granular level. However, much of the reporting, both at the FTA and local dashboards, provides information at the aggregate level. Aggregate-level data hides a lot of the subtlety of the problem and the efficacy of solutions. For example, not all crimes are the same. Public transportation agencies that reduce mortality to zero yet have crime rates that remain above their target threshold should not consider that a failure. The performance metrics in the NDT are so numerous, we understand the need to aggregate. However, aggregating at the wrong level, really provides misleading information. Similarly, an injury that

results from trains colliding is much different from an injury from non-WMATA contracted employees who slip on WMATA property. While the concerns over all incidents are important, internal incident evaluations should make distinctions by severity.

- Major metropolitan public transportation systems are extraordinarily complex. The learning costs to understand a component of these systems, such as incident management, for those outside the agency are high. Consistently collaborating with a research partner or set of partners, like the arrangement in Queensland, could support several of the important functions we described earlier:
    - Someone to evaluate formally the impact of changes implemented by WMATA using rigorous approaches that would remove confounds from the analysis;
    - A partner with the expertise to estimate the appropriate level of aggregation for outcomes;
    - And a fresh set of eyes to suggest internal system changes that might be difficult for WMATA personnel who are focused on the day-to-day operations. The longer these partnerships exist and the more familiar the research partner becomes with WMATA, the more insightful the partner is likely to be.

Phase Two

Objective

The X Lab presented findings from phase one to WMATA on June 3, 2022. During this meeting, the project teams refined the research objective for a second phase of the project. For this next phase, the X Lab was tasked with gathering information about performance metrics that measure the quality of response to an incident.

Methodology

In this phase, the X Lab requested interviews with military officers, airport leaders, airline representatives, and incident management professionals to collect data on the quality of responses to incidents. We completed extensive interviews with several military officers, the executive director of an airport in a medium-sized city, and the emergency manager for a transportation department in a large-sized city. In addition to these interviews, we reviewed many technical documents that provide information on the performance metrics for several of these organizations. We include several of these documents in the appendix as examples.

Major Findings

1. None of the parties we spoke with used performance metrics for actual incidents. We consistently heard that standardized measures are only utilized to evaluate incident response performance in *training exercises* and *drills.* They do not systematically assess performance for "real-life incidents" because they are too variable and unpredictable. All parties consistently

stated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate responses in an equitable manner due to the uncertain nature of the incidents. Our interviewees also shared that performance metrics can be more easily measured during trainings and drills because these environments can be controlled and replicated.

2. Closely related, a consistent set of performance metrics was not used across groups, but they all seemed to adjust the performance metrics based on experience and learning from actual events (see next point). For example, our emergency management contact shared that they measure if their team has cleared roads within 12 hours of the end of winter storms.
3. When real-life incidents do occur, organizations often conducted conversational debriefs in informal settings after the event. One party explained that "there is no rank during these meetings." These discussions cover what went well, what did not go according to plan, and the scenarios and conditions the organization should focus on when training to be better prepared. As mentioned in point 2, these debriefings may lead to changes in the training protocols and performance metrics.
4. In addition to the trainings and drills, passenger and employee feedback surveys are another self-assessment tool used. These surveys are often conducted by outside parties and allow the leadership to learn about management on a smaller scale before larger issues surface. For example, the airport executive explained that they became aware of concerns about the scarcity of parking through these channels long before this problem created a public concern, which might involve political actors.

Preparedness through training and the designation of operations personnel to that process is key to building and maintaining a high-quality incident management system. Relevant details about the performance metrics and response systems for these organizations are outlined below.

U.S. Army Incident Response Training and Evaluation

The Army utilizes a highly regimented and detailed framework for conducting their incident response management trainings and drills. Within this framework, every possible incident and response scenario is referred to as a "task set," such as "Conduct a Decontamination Operation" or "Conduct a Traffic Accident Investigation." Tasks are further divided into a list of every step and measure that should be taken to complete the task up to standard. Some steps and measures are labelled with symbols to indicate that they should be completed by a leader (*) and/or if they are considered critical (+). All this information is listed on training outline documents. For an example, see the task set for "Conducting a Traffic Management Collision Incident (TMCI)" in the appendix, part 1.

For each incident drill, the Army has a Task Evaluation Criteria Matrix (also in the appendix). For an Army unit to be deemed ready and certified to complete a task in a real situation, such as conducting a traffic accident investigation or a chemical decontamination, they must successfully complete a certain

percentage of the steps and measures associated with that task set event. The successful completion of a step/measure is a labeled a "Go," and the unsuccessful completion of a step/measure is labeled a "No-Go." For example, to achieve trained (T) status for the TMCI Task, a unit must receive a Go on 80% of all steps, 85% of all leader steps (*), and 100% of all critical steps (+). If they receive a Go on 65%-79% of all steps, 75%-84% of all leader steps, or less than 100% of all critical steps, the unit will receive a status of Needs Practice (P), and, if they fail to reach that P threshold, they will receive a status of Untrained (U).

In addition to completing a certain percentage of steps, units must also successfully complete trainings both in the day and at night, and drills must be evaluated by both their commander and by an external evaluator (someone from outside their unit, often a professional evaluator). Once a unit has met all these criteria, they are considered trained and ready to complete that task for the next 180 days. After 180 days, the unit will need to complete a re-certification training to renew their trained status. Additionally, as the unit responds to real incidents, their performance will be observed and discussed, and additional trainings may be required if they are not completing tasks up to standard.

To maintain this extensive incident management training system, the Army dedicates an entire branch of their operating team to overseeing, evaluating, and updating this system. This team provides external evaluations for incident trainings, and, for real-life incidents, they lead round table debriefs to discuss what went well, what needs improvement, and how to achieve those improvements. They are also in charge of writing out the training outlines including the evaluation matrixes, the lists of steps and measures, and more. Additionally, they stay up to date on the latest incident management best practices. They also manage a database where all the training outlines are stored, making sure only the most up-to-date versions are available and distributing new training outlines to relevant personnel.

Airport Incident Management

In addition to the assessments during drills as described earlier, many airports self-assess their performance through passenger and employee surveys. These surveys are conducted as a part of the Airport Service Quality Program (ASQ) developed by the Airport Council International (ACI). See the appendix, part 2 for an example of an ASQ dashboard. These surveys provide data on all aspects of the passenger and employee experience. Passenger surveys include details on the availability of restrooms, the clarity of signage/instructions about safety, and the efficiency of check-in procedures, among many other things. Employee surveys focus on employee experiences, asking questions about their desire to continue contributing to the airport's mission, their ability to satisfy customers, and their determination to build positive relationships with both customers and colleagues.

Survey questions are measured using a five-point satisfaction scale, one being the least satisfied and five being the most satisfied. Averaging this survey data shows the airport areas where they are

performing well and passengers/employees are satisfied, and areas where they are not performing as well. This data can be compared to the same airport values at an earlier time to determine if there has been improvement (or decline) as well as estimating how they stand relative to similar airports. Using these averages, the airport can implement changes to address areas of low satisfaction. In the aftermath of an incident or an incident training, surveys can be used to provide additional information on the experiences of both customers and employees, showing the airport where improvements may be needed.

In addition to surveys, the airport leader we interviewed explained that they also utilize a comprehensive Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) to prepare for incidents and evaluate their response. This document describes the airport's proposed response to a wide variety of possible emergencies, from hazardous materials incidents to water rescue situations. The plan describes assignment of responsibilities, operational details, and administrative logistics.

Like the Army task sets, the AEP also includes specific steps and measures that should be taken in the event of different emergencies. For example, this plan explains that if there is a need for shelter, the center of the terminal, away from the windows, is the best area to use. Another scenario explains that in the case of an airport fire, at least one emergency airport vehicle is expected to have reached a certain point on the runway within three minutes of the initial fire alarm. Annual drills on these different scenarios allow leadership to assess the quality of performance.

Emergency Management within Department of Transportation

Our conversation with the emergency manager confirmed the main points shared above from the Army and airport contacts. This department does not have a universal definition of an incident. However, certain events generate automatic responses to prepare for a major incident. For example, winter weather is a reliable trigger and teams are prepared to handle several different situations brought on by these conditions. If it is predicted that a weather event lasting more than 12 hours will occur, this triggers the department to activate the incident management team. (The incident management team is made of personnel within the department.)

The department does not have performance metrics that measure the quality of response. Alternatively, they have metrics that are event specific. For example, the contact shared that when there are severe weather events like winter storms, one metric they use to assess their performance is to clear storms within 12 hours of its completion. Identifying conditions or circumstances that are associated with predictable incidents is one strategy to establish trainings and performance metrics.

When asked about how their team evaluates their work, our contact shared that they conduct "after action" debriefs following a real-life incident. Similar to the discussions described above, these meetings

are used for internal assessment and rank does not matter. They discuss if they resolved the issue, if they did well, and what can they improve. Then, they rate themselves and track when and how to implement any changes identified. Personnel in attendance include the incident management commander, public officer, safety liaison, and personnel in charge of logistics, finance, planning, and operations.

The incident management team is made up of individuals who have other roles in the department. For example, someone may be a supervisor in their department role, but on the incident management team, they may be a director or an even higher rank. Our contact also shared that individuals who did not respond to a particular incident, but who are part of the incident management team, also participate.

In addition to the after action debriefs, the department gathers external measures for evaluation. An external evaluator monitors public sentiment and reports if sentiment is neutral, negative, or positive. Our contact also shared that performance reports from political leaders are important as well, as they receive data on the mayor's sentiment.

In addition, the contact aims to manifest a strong culture of incident management within and outside their department. Our contact emphasized that a quality response requires strong relationships that are maintained before and after an incident occurs. Internally, they distribute a training newsletter across the department that shares learning opportunities. They explained that this tool is a way to "make [incident management] a part of everyday life, not just when things go bad." In addition, fostering and maintaining connections with other response agencies is crucial for high-quality responses. For example, the contact meets at least once per month with other agencies [fire, police, metro (rail)] to share information and build relationships. They explained that these actions establish strong bonds that improve coordination and efficiency when incidents do occur.

Appendix.

1. Conduct a Traffic Accident Investigation

Training and Evaluation Outline Report

Status: Approved
17 Jun 2019
Effective Date: 15 Jul 2021

Task Number: 19-DET-4106

Task Title: Conduct a Traffic Management Collision Investigation (TMCI)

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document
Foreign Disclosure: FD1 - This training product has been reviewed by the training developers in coordination with the FLW MSCoE foreign disclosure officer. This training product can be used to instruct international military students from all approved countries without restrictions.

Supporting Reference(s):

Step Number	Reference ID	Reference Name	Required	Primary	Source Information
	AR 190-5	MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC SUPERVISION	Yes	Yes	
	ATP 3-39.12	LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS	Yes	No	
	ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	Yes	No	
	ATP 3-39.4	Military Police Platoons	Yes	No	
	CVB	United States District Court Violation Notice	Yes	No	
	DA FORM 2823	SWORN STATEMENT	Yes	No	
	DA FORM 3946	MILITARY POLICE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT	Yes	No	
	DA FORM 3975	MILITARY POLICE REPORT	Yes	No	
	DD FORM 1408	ARMED FORCES TRAFFIC TICKET (BOOK, CONSISTING OF 25 THREE-PART SETS)	Yes	No	
	DODI 6055.04	DOD Traffic Safety Program (incorporating Change 2)	Yes	No	

Conditions: TheLE detachment is directed to establish military police operations. Police operations, standing operating procedures (SOPs), MOU/ MOA, regulations and legal requirements with adjacent jurisdictions are established. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) identified constraints must be considered. Command is directed to perform military police operations by the senior mission command headquarters. Conventional, unconventional, and hybrid threats expected. Patrols have responded and secured the scene. The Traffic Management Collision Investigation (TMCI) team has been dispatched with all the necessary investigative equipment to process the scene of a traffic accident. The standard operating procedure (SOP) is available. This task should not be trained in MOPP 4.

Standards: The scene is secure. The investigation is conducted. All mandatory reports are prepared to document the investigation and are submitted for approval and signature according to the SOPs, MOA/MOU, regulations, legal requirements with adjacent jurisdictions. All joint, multinational, and collateral investigations are concluded. The mission is performed IAW ATP3-39.10, command directives, orders, and regulations.

NOTE: The leaders are Commander, Detachment Sergeant, MP Desk NCOIC, Traffic Investigation NCOIC, Military Police Investigation NCOIC, Force Protection NCOIC as listed in the task steps and performance measures.

Live Fire: No

Objective Task Evaluation Criteria Matrix:

Plan and Prepare			Execute						Assess	
Operational Environment CO & BN		Training Environment (L/V/C)	Leaders Present at Training/Required	Present at Training/Required	External Eval	Performance Measures	Critical Performance Measures	Leader Performance Measures	Evaluator's Observed Task Proficiency Rating	Commander's Assessment
Dynamic and Complex (4+ OE Variables and Hybrid Threat)	Night	IAW unit CATS statement.	>=75%	>=80%	Yes	>=80%	All	>=85%	T	T
									T-	T-
Dynamic (Single Threat)	Day		60-74%	60-79%	No	65-79%	<All	75-84%	P	P
									P-	P-
Static (Single Threat)			<=59%	<=59%		<=64%		<=74%	U	U

Remarks: None

Notes: None

Safety Risk: Low

Task Statements

Cue: None

DANGER

Soldiers must constantly be alert for and avoid situations that may result in injury or death. At the training site, leaders must establish training safety overview procedures.

WARNING

Soldiers must be alert to human error and know the capabilities and limitations of the equipment and vehicles they use. Following the proper safety procedures preserves troop strength by preventing personnel losses through accidents.

CAUTION

The possibility of personal injury or damage to equipment that may result from long-term failure to follow correct procedures.

Performance Steps and Measures

NOTE: Assess task proficiency using the task evaluation criteria matrix.

NOTE: Asterisks (*) indicate leader steps; plus signs (+) indicate critical steps.

STEP/MEASURE	GO	NO-GO	N/A
+ 1. The TMCI team responds and takes control of the accident scene.			
Note: Police intelligence operations is a military police function, integrated within all military police operations. MP leaders/staffs will consider police intelligence operations when planning all MP operations.			
+ a. Receives a briefing about the accident from the senior patrol officer present.			
b. Evaluates the accident scene.			
+ c. Ensures that the accident scene was protected and secured.			
d. Ensures that medical attention was provided for injured persons.			
e. Implements traffic control measures.			
f. Takes appropriate action to identify and coordinates containment of hazardous materials at the scene (request HAZMAT or Fire Department if needed).			
+ g. Safeguards classified materials.			
2. The TMCI team identifies the personnel involved.			
a. Determines the identities of the victims.			
b. Determines the identities of the suspects.			
c. Determines the identities of key witnesses.			
d. Runs checks on personnel (for license status and warrants).			
+ 3. The lead TMCI investigator forms an investigative plan.			
a. Identifies the type of offense committed.			
b. Determines the team members' investigative responsibilities.			
+ c. Requests assistance from other LE agencies (such as the criminal investigation division, military police investigators, and the host nation authorities).			
+ 4. The TMCI team processes the accident scene.			
a. Records investigative notes and sketches.			
b. Photographs the scene.			
c. Marks final position of all vehicles and debris.			
d. Collects physical evidence, to include evidence of drug or alcohol involvement (notifies MPI if required).			
e. Issues citation(s) if determined or needed.			
+ 5. The TMCI team clears the scene.			
a. Coordinates with dispatch/desk operations to remove vehicles and debris.			
+ b. Reestablishes the traffic flow through existing or alternate routes.			
+ c. Exit-briefs the local military police/civilian police/host nation LE.			
+* 6. The TMCI team leader directs the investigative team to pursue leads. The TMCI team leader ensures that the investigative team—			
+ a. Interviews the victims and witnesses.			
b. Obtains written statements from the victims and witnesses, if appropriate.			
c. Advises the suspect/subject(s) of his legal rights.			
+ d. Interviews the suspect/subject(s).			
e. Obtains a written statement from the suspect/subject(s).			
f. Collects related documents to support the specific investigation, such as vehicle dispatches, and the operator's report of accident.			
g. Recreates and documents accident events (by DA Form 3946 or digital imagery if available).			
h. Coordinates with the staff judge advocate as necessary.			
+ 7. The TMCI team prepares case documents and the appropriate reports according to the SOP, MOU/MOA, regulations and legal requirements with adjacent jurisdictions.			
+ 8. The TMCI team submits the initial report to the TMCI supervisor for review and approval.			
a. Completes the evidence documents.			
b. Releases the evidence to the evidence custodian.			
c. Identifies the need for crime lab analysis of evidence.			
d. Requests a crime lab examination, if applicable.			
e. Obtains specialized investigative support, such as an accident reconstructionist or mechanical inspector.			
+ f. Completes all the identified leads and steps of the investigative plan.			
9. The TMCI supervisor reviews the report.			
a. Determine if case needs additional investigation or can be closed.			
b. Submits the case for blotter reviewing.			
+ 10. The team prepares the final report.			

a. Drafts the final report.

b. Submits the final draft for the TMCI supervisor's review.

* 11. TMCI supervisor completes report.

a. Request an opine from SJA.

b. Submits the final report to the appropriate authority for approval/signature, according to the SOP, MOU/MOA, regulations and legal requirements with adjacent jurisdictions.

Task Performance Summary Block										
Training Unit			ITERATION							
_____			1		2		3		4	
Date of Training per Iteration:										
Day or Night Training:			Day / Night		Day / Night		Day / Night		Day / Night	
			#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Total Leaders Authorized		% Leaders Present								
Total Soldiers Authorized		% Soldiers Present								
Total Number of Performance Measures		% Performance Measures 'GO'								
Total Number of Critical Performance Measures		% Critical Performance Measures 'GO'								
Live Fire, Total Number of Critical Performance Measures		% Critical Performance Measures 'GO'								
Total Number of Leader Performance Measures		% Leader Performance Measures 'GO'								
MOPP LEVEL										
Evaluated Rating per Iteration T, T-, P, P-, U										

Missions(s) supported:

Mission ID	Mission Title	Frequency	Recommended Interval
Police Operations	Police Operations	0	Not Selected

MOPP 4: Never

MOPP 4 Statement: None

NVG: Never

NVG Statement: None

Prerequisite Collective Task(s): None

Supporting Collective Task(s):

Step Number	Task Number	Title	Proponent	Status
	19-DET-1201	Prepare a Traffic Control Plan	19 - Military Police (Collective)	Approved
	71-CO-5100	Conduct Troop Leading Procedures	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved

OPFOR Task(s): None

Supporting Individual Task(s):

Step Number	Task Number	Title	Proponent	Status
	191-LET-0029	Investigate a Traffic Collison	191 - Military Police (Individual)	Approved
	191-LET-0031	Respond to a Traffic Collision	191 - Military Police (Individual)	Approved

Supporting Drill(s): None

Supported AUTL/UJTL Task(s):

Task ID	Title
ART 6.13.1	PERFORM LAW ENFORCEMENT
ART 6.13	Conduct Police Operations
ART 6.13.3	Conduct Traffic Management and Enforcement

TADSS

TADSS ID	Title	Product Type	Quantity
07-132	Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) Large Suite	DVC	1
07-133	Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) Small Suite	DVC	1
05-113/1	IEDES, Increment 1, (IEDES1) Pressure Plate Training Device	SIM	1
05-113/2	Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator, Increment 1, (IEDES1) Push Pull Booby Trap	SIM	1
05-113/3	Improvised Explosive Device Effects Simulator, Increment 1, (IEDES1) Man Worn Suicide Vest (SV)	SIM	1
07-129	Engagement Skills Trainer II (EST II)	SIM	1
07-162	Close Combat Mission Capability Kit (CCMCK) for M9 Semi-Automatic Pistol	DVC	1
55-62	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Egress Assistance Trainer (HEAT)	SIM	1
05-113	IED Effects Simulator, Increment 1, (IEDES 1) MILES Emitter Unit (MEU)	SIM	1

Equipment (LIN)

LIN	Nomenclature	Qty
A32355	ALARM CHEMICAL AGENT	1
B49272	BAYONET M7 W/SCABBARD	1
C68719	CA TEL WD-1A/TT DR-8	1
C86213	Invalid LIN – Do Not Use	1
C89070	SUPPORT ASSEMBLY CAMO	1
C89480	Camouflage Net System, Radar Scattering: ULCANS-AN/USQ-159	1
D20400	DISPENSER RIOT CONTRO	1
D40533	Digital Nonsecure Voice Terminal (DNVT): TA-954TT	1
L46007	LAUNCH GRENA M203A1	1
M09009	MACH GUN 5.56MM M249	1
M11895	MASK CHEMICAL-BIOLO	1
M12418	MASK CHEM-BIOL M40A1	1
N05482	Night Vision Goggle AN/PVS-7A/B/D	1
P47365	PI 9 MIL AUTO TY 1	1
P98152	PISTOL 9MM AUTOMATIC	1
R20684	RADIAC SET AN/VDR-2	1
R31061	RADIAC ST AN/UDR-13	1
R59160	Invalid LIN – Do Not Use	1
R68146	Radio Set: AN/VRC-91F(C)	1
R97234	RIFLE 5.56 MM M4	1
T31872	Telephone Wire with Reel: MX-10891G	1
T61494	Truck Utility: Cargo/Troop Carrier 1-1/4 Ton 4x4 W/E (HMMWV): M998	1
T95992	Light Tactical Trailer: 3/4 Ton	1
S90535	Medium Weapon Thermal Sight (MWTS): ANPAS-13(V)2	1
D78555	Data Transfer Device: AN/CYZ-10	1

Materiel Items (NSN)

NSN	LIN	Title	Qty
5985-01-063-1574	A79381	Antenna Group: OE-254()/GRC	1
1005-01-128-9936	R95035	Rifle 5.56 Millimeter: M16A2	1

Environment: Environmental protection is not just the law but the right thing to do. It is a continual process and starts with deliberate planning. Always be alert to ways to protect our environment during training and missions. In doing so, you will contribute to the sustainment of our training resources while protecting people and the environment from harmful effects. Refer to the current Environmental Considerations manual and the current GTA Environmental-related Risk Assessment card. Environmental protection is not just the law but the right thing to do. It is a continual process and starts with deliberate planning. Always be alert to ways to protect our environment during training and missions. In doing so, you will contribute to the sustainment of our training resources while protecting people and the environment from harmful effects. Refer to the current Environmental Considerations manual and the current GTA Environmental-related Risk Assessment card.

Safety: In a training environment, leaders must perform a risk assessment in accordance with current Risk Management Doctrine. Leaders will complete the current Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet in accordance with the TRADOC Safety Officer during the planning and completion of each task and sub-task by assessing mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations, (METT-TC). Note: During MOPP training, leaders must ensure personnel are monitored for potential heat injury. Local policies and procedures must be followed during times of increased heat category in order to avoid heat related injury. Consider the MOPP work/rest cycles and water replacement guidelines IAW current CBRN doctrine. In a training environment, leaders must perform a risk assessment in accordance with ATP 5-19, Risk Management. Leaders will complete the current Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet in accordance with the TRADOC Safety Officer during the planning and completion of each task and sub-task by assessing mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations, (METT-TC). Note: During MOPP training, leaders must ensure personnel are monitored for potential heat injury. Local policies and procedures must be followed during times of increased heat category in order to avoid heat related injury. Consider the MOPP work/rest cycles and water replacement guidelines IAW FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination.

2. Airport Service Quality (ASQ) survey dashboard.